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CROSSING THE LINE: TECHNIQUES OF CLOSING ARGUMENT 
THAT ARE OUT OF BOUNDS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 
Blake R. Hills
*
 & Matthew J. Hansen
** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In soccer, the ball is not out of bounds until it has completely crossed 
the line.1 Some players try to take advantage of this rule by dribbling the ball 
as close to the line as they can—or even on top of the line—when they at-
tempt to advance the ball past the other team. However, the slightest misstep 
can lead to the ball going out of bounds. Other players end up kicking the 
ball out of bounds because they are not paying attention to the line. Some 
players purposefully kick the ball out of bounds as a last-ditch effort to pre-
vent the other team from scoring. 
Some prosecutors and defense attorneys take similar approaches in 
their closing arguments. Some get close to, or on the line and make a mis-
step in the heat of the argument. Others may make a mistake by not knowing 
where the line of permissible argument is. A few may cross the line deliber-
ately in a desperate attempt to win the case. Although kicking the ball out of 
bounds may sometimes be a legitimate tactical move in soccer, it is never 
proper for an attorney to cross the line in closing argument. 
The consequences of making an improper closing argument can range 
from irritating to catastrophic. Improper argument could lead to an objection 
from opposing counsel and an admonishment from the judge, causing the 
jury to wonder, “What was this lawyer trying to pull?”2 Improper argument 
may also be a violation of ethical rules.3 Finally, improper argument may 
lead to the reversal of the case on appeal,4 with a retrial and a new closing 
argument years later. In order to help prosecutors and defense attorneys es-
 
* Prosecuting Attorney, Summit County Utah Attorney’s Office. J.D., S.J. Quinney Universi-
ty of Utah College of Law (1998). 
** Deputy County Attorney, Weber County Utah Attorney’s Office, J.D., S.J. Quinney Uni-
versity of Utah College of Law (2001). 
 1. STANLEY LOVER, SOCCER RULES ILLUSTRATED 22 (2009). 
 2. Colonel Grant C. Jaquith, A View from the Bench: Apply the Golden Rule, But Don’t 
Argue It, ARMY LAWYER, May 2008, at 36, 39–40. 
 3. See, e.g., UTAH RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (“A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, 
allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when 
testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility 
of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused.”). 
 4. See, e.g., State v. Akok, 348 P.3d 377, 385 (Utah Ct. App. 2015). 
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cape these negative consequences, this Article will identify the most com-
mon forms of improper closing argument that must be avoided. 
II. ARGUMENT THAT IS OUT OF BOUNDS 
Most of what an attorney presents in a jury trial is controlled by very 
specific statutes or evidentiary rules. That is not the case with closing argu-
ment. Indeed, most of the restrictions on closing argument come from case 
law. It is important to note upfront that the rules of closing argument apply 
equally to both the prosecution and the defense.5 As the United States Su-
preme Court has stated: 
It is clear that counsel on both sides of the table share a duty to confine 
arguments to the jury within proper bounds. Just as the conduct of prose-
cutors is circumscribed, “[t]he interests of society in the preservation of 
courtroom control by the judges are no more to be frustrated through un-
checked improprieties by defenders.”6 
A. Personal Attacks Against Opposing Counsel 
It is improper for an attorney to make a personal attack on opposing 
counsel during closing argument. These arguments generally amount to an 
attack on opposing counsel’s character and credibility. 
A classic example of this sort of improper argument was made in Unit-
ed States v. Young.7 In that case, the defense counsel’s argument included a 
number of personal attacks: 
Defense counsel began his own summation by arguing that the case 
against respondent “has been presented unfairly by the prosecution,” and 
that “[f]rom the beginning” to “this very moment the [prosecution’s] 
statements have been made to poison your minds unfairly.” He intimated 
that the prosecution deliberately withheld exculpatory evidence, and pro-
ceeded to charge the prosecution with “reprehensible” conduct in pur-
portedly attempting to cast a false light on respondent’s activities. De-
fense counsel also pointed directly at the prosecutor’s table and stated: “I 
submit to you that there’s not a person in this courtroom including those 
sitting at this table who think that Billy Young intended to defraud Ap-
co.” Finally, defense counsel stated that respondent had been “the only 
 
 5. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 8 (1985). 
 6. Id. (quoting Sachar v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8 (1952). See also United States v. 
Wexler, 79 F.2d 526, 530 (2d Cir. 1935) (stating that “the truth is not likely to emerge, if the 
prosecution is confined to such detached exposition as would be appropriate in a lecture, 
while the defense is allowed those appeals in misericordiam which long custom has come to 
sanction.”). 
 7. 470 U.S. at 4–5. 
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one in this whole affair that has acted with honor and with integrity” and 
that “[t]hese complex . . . regulations should not have any place in an ef-
fort to put someone away.”8 
The United Sates Supreme Court had no hesitation finding that this argu-
ment was improper, noting that, “[d]efense counsel, like his adversary, must 
not be permitted to make unfounded and inflammatory attacks on the oppos-
ing advocate.”9 The Court also stated that, “[T]he kind of advocacy shown 
by this record has no place in the administration of justice and should nei-
ther be permitted nor rewarded.”10 Indeed, the Court found that the argument 
was so improper that it mitigated any potential harm from the prosecutor’s 
own improper conduct and thus ruled that the conviction should be upheld.11 
Indeed, direct accusations that opposing counsel is lying will always be 
found to be improper. One such personal attack occurred in State v. Lyles.12 
In closing argument, the prosecutor stated, “How do you explain the keys 
were in [the defendant’s] pockets? Police Officer Yates didn’t lie. Defense 
counsel is either confused or she’s lying or trying to mislead you.”13 The 
Missouri Court of Appeals found that this accusation that defense counsel 
was lying was improper and objectionable.14 
A similar improper argument was made in State v. Pham.15 In that case, 
the prosecutor stated in closing argument that defense counsel “did not want 
the truth” and “did not care about the truth.”16 The prosecutor also stated, 
“Boy, if you’re going to be looking at the credibility of the witnesses, you 
might also start with some of these lawyers.”17 The Kansas Court of Appeals 
found that this argument “constituted gross and flagrant misconduct that 
denied the defendant a fair trial.”18 
Courts also frown on arguments that do not directly accuse opposing 
counsel of lying but are an attack on counsel’s character. For instance, the 
prosecutor in State v. Campos 
began his rebuttal by discussing at length the idiom of a red herring as “a 
technique to confuse or distract.” In applying the idiom to this case, the 
prosecutor stated, “And is there any relationship with a red herring and 
the defense in this case? They would have you believe an almost unbe-
 
 8. Id. (citations omitted). 
 9. Id. at 9. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 17–20. 
 12. 996 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. 10 P.3d 780, 787–88 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000). 
 16. Id. at 787. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 787–88. 
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lievable story. Why? Simply to confuse and distract. . . . Why would 
they do that? Just a red herring. A ploy to confuse and distract.”19 
The Utah Court of Appeals found that this argument was an improper attack 
on defense counsel’s character because it amounted to a claim that counsel 
intended to mislead the jury.20 The court stated that “[a]rguing that the evi-
dence does not support the defense theory and that the theory is thus a dis-
traction from the ultimate issue is fundamentally different from arguing that 
defense counsel is intentionally trying to distract and mislead the jury.”21 
Courts distinguish personal attacks on counsel from argument directed 
at defense theories. For instance, the Utah Court of Appeals held in State v. 
Fouse that when a defense attorney asserted in closing argument that the 
prosecution did not believe its own theory of the case, it was not improper 
for the prosecutor to state in rebuttal that the assertion was “asinine” and a 
“red herring.”22 The court stated that the difference between this argument 
and the one in Campos was that “calling defense counsel’s theory a distrac-
tion or irrelevant is permissible but accusing opposing counsel of using such 
a distraction as part of a purposeful scheme to mislead the jury is not.”23 
Similarly, the Idaho Court of Appeals held in State v. Norton that a prosecu-
tor referring to some of the defense arguments as “red herrings and smoke 
and mirrors” was not improper because the comments “were not directed at 
defense counsel personally, but were comments on defense theories.”24 In 
addition, the Missouri Court of Appeals found in State v. Kennedy that the 
prosecutor referring to defense counsel as “Mr. Talking Loud But Saying 
Nothing” was not impermissible.25 The court found that although this char-
acterization was unflattering, it was a permissible declaration that the de-
fense argument “contained sound, but no substance.”26 
 
 19. 309 P.3d 1160, 1175 (Utah Ct. App. 2013). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. 319 P.3d 778, 786–87 (Utah Ct. App. 2014). 
 23. Id. at 786 (citing Campos, 309 P.3d 1160). In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals re-
ferred to the argument of appellate counsel as a “red herring” in a case after it decided Cam-
pos. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Smaistrala, –– P.3d –– (Utah Ct. App. 
2018), No. 20160401-CA, 2018 WL 4178311, at *8 n.8. 
 24. 254 P.3d 77, 90 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011). 
 25. 107 S.W.3d 306, 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
 26. Id. The difference between this statement and the improper one in Campos, 309 P.3d 
1160 (Utah Ct. App. 2013), is that this was merely an argument that the defense position was 
unsupported by any substance, while the statement in Campos was an accusation that the 
defense was trying to trick the jury. See supra text accompanying notes 19–21. 
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B. Commenting on the Defendant’s Exercise of Constitutional Rights 
It is improper for a prosecutor to comment on a defendant’s exercise of 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights during closing argument. This is errone-
ous because it implies that the jury should infer guilt or draw an adverse 
influence from this exercise of rights. 
The leading case on the impropriety of commenting on a defendant’s 
decision not to testify at trial is Griffin v. California.27 During the closing 
argument of this capital murder case, the prosecutor listed all of the things 
the defendant knew and could have testified about, but didn’t: 
He would know that. He would know how she got down the alley. He 
would know how the blood got on the bottom of the concrete steps. He 
would know how long he was with her in that box. He would know how 
her wig got off. He would know whether he beat her or mistreated her. 
He would know whether he walked away from that place cool as a cu-
cumber . . . because he was conscious of his own guilt and wanted to get 
away from that damaged or injured woman. These things he has not seen 
fit to take the stand and deny or explain. And in the whole world, if any-
body would know, this defendant would know. Essie Mae is dead, she 
can’t tell you her side of the story. The defendant won’t.28 
The United States Supreme Court held that this argument violated the de-
fendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination 
because commenting on a defendant’s silence is “a penalty imposed by 
courts for exercising a constitutional privilege” that “cuts down on the privi-
lege by making its assertion costly.”29 
Indirect comments on the defendant’s decision not to testify are also 
improper. For instance, the prosecutor in United States v. Carter made re-
peated statements in closing argument that the government’s evidence was 
“uncontroverted” and “uncontradicted.”30 The Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces held that these comments in closing argument were an “im-
permissible reference to the [defendant’s] exercise of the privilege against 
self-incrimination” when “the defendant alone has the information to con-
tradict the government evidence referred to or the jury ‘naturally and neces-
sarily’ would interpret the summation as comment on the failure of the ac-
cused to testify.”31 However, not every comment that evidence is uncontra-
dicted is improper. For instance, the Arizona Court of Appeals held in State 
v. Blackman that it was permissible for the prosecutor to argue in closing 
 
 27. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
 28. Id. at 611. 
 29. Id. at 614. 
 30. 61 M.J. 30, 32–33 (C.A.A.F. 2005). 
 31. Id. at 34. 
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that the victim’s testimony was “uncontradicted” because there were other 
people at the crime scene and the defendant was not the only person who 
could have contradicted or otherwise explained the evidence.32 
It is also improper for a prosecutor to complain about a defendant’s ex-
ercise of his right to have a trial. For example, the prosecutor in State v. 
Thompson stated in closing that the defendant’s decision to go to trial 
amounted to him “hiding behind the law” and “sticking the law in some-
body’s eye.”33 The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that this amounted 
to improper argument because: 
The exercise of the right to a jury trial is thus considered no less funda-
mental in our jurisprudence than reliance upon the right to remain silent. 
Accordingly, prosecutorial argument complaining a criminal defendant 
has failed to plead guilty and thereby put the State to its burden of proof 
is no less impermissible than an argument commenting upon a defend-
ant’s failure to testify. Indeed, we discern no distinction between the two 
in terms of intrusion upon a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights. 
We therefore hold that reference by the State to a defendant’s failure to 
plead guilty is violative of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
34
 
C. Expressions of Personal Opinion 
Henry David Thoreau once opined that men should “not trouble [them-
selves] to get new things, whether clothes or friends . . . [they] should sell 
[their] clothes and keep [their] thoughts.”35 Such is the challenge for every 
prosecutor and defense attorney, who wonders why they should keep their 
thoughts to themselves when they are being paid to be opinionated. Howev-
er, it is improper for an attorney to express a personal opinion in closing 
argument. 
An example of this type of improper argument occurred in the case of 
Bates v. Bell, in which the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder 
and was sentenced to death after he escaped police custody in Kentucky, 
stole a firearm, and then crossed state lines and killed a person in Tennes-
see.36 During closing argument of the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor 
contested the mitigation evidence offered by the defense attorneys through 
their expert—Dr. Griffin: 
I don’t really care what Griffin says. I don’t care at all what [the defense 
attorneys say] because I believe this to be true, and I believe you share 
 
 32. 38 P.3d 1192, 1209–10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002). 
 33. 454 S.E.2d 271, 276 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995). 
 34. Id. 
 35. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN OR LIFE IN THE WOODS (1854). 
 36. 402 F.3d 635, 637–640 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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the same belief . . . You don’t believe [the testimony about mitigating 
evidence], and I don’t believe it; and I don’t even believe [defense coun-
sel] believe that . . . [The State’s expert] says it is a character flaw; I tend 
to agree with him . . . You don’t believe [Griffin’s testimony], and I 
don’t believe that . . . I don’t believe [Griffin’s testimony]. That is just 
not common sense. I don’t give a darn how many articles that Dr. Griffin 
reads to develop his theory of what is right.
37
 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this argument was improper.38 
The court stated that it is improper for prosecutors to “put forth their opin-
ions as to credibility of a witness, guilt of a defendant, or appropriateness of 
capital punishment.”39 This is because the “prosecutor’s opinion carries with 
it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the 
Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.”40 
A similar improper argument was given in State v. Alwin, in which the 
defense had put on an expert to testify about eyewitness identification is-
sues.41 To counter this evidence, the prosecutor stated in closing argument, 
“[A]nd I completely disagree with the expert. I know that, you know, he’s 
got some fancy titles and stuff, that when you’re under stress, you focus 
less. I completely disagree. I think that a lot of people get hyperfocused [sic] 
when they stress.”42 
The Idaho Supreme Court held that this was improper expression of 
personal opinion.43 The court so held because the prosecutor did not attack 
the credibility of expert, but instead expressed a personal belief that he disa-
greed with the expert’s testimony when there was no other evidence that 
discussed individuals becoming “hyperfocused” when stressed.44 
However, not all expressions of opinion are improper. For instance, the 
prosecutor in State v. Stricklin, in referring to evidence about cell phone 
calls, stated in closing argument: 
At 11:13 . . . Stricklin has no more calls. From 11:13 until 12:34, he has 
no more calls. And the call that he wants you to believe he’s traveling 
while it’s being made, that call wasn’t answered at 12:34. Why are there 
 
 37. Id. at 645–46. 
 38. Id. at 646. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1985). Although this case 
dealt with an expression of personal opinion by a prosecutor, it is also improper for a defense 
attorney to make expressions of personal opinion during closing argument. See MODEL CODE 
OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(C)(3) and (4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1984). 
 41. 426 P.3d 1260 (Idaho 2018). 
 42. Id. at 1272. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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no more calls? The two of them are together. And in my mind . . . Strick-
lin turned his phone off. He had no incoming or outgoing calls at all be-
tween 11:13 and 12:34.
45
 
The defendant argued on appeal that the prosecutor’s use of “in my mind” 
was an improper expression of personal opinion.46 The Nebraska Supreme 
Court held that the statement was not improper because rather than express-
ing an opinion on the veracity of evidence or the guilt of the defendant, the 
prosecutor was only providing an interpretation about what the cell phone 
evidence meant.47 
D. Inflaming the Passions or Prejudices of the Jury 
Because jurors are human beings, “there is no denying that in many in-
stances emotion will influence the outcome.”48 However, it is improper for 
an attorney to use closing argument to inflame the passions and prejudices 
of the jury. “Defining exactly where an argument crosses over the line of 
propriety and inflames passions or prejudices is often difficult to establish 
and depends upon the context in which the comments were made.”49 
In State v. Campos, the victim was paralyzed from the waist down as a 
result of being shot by the defendant.50 During closing argument, the prose-
cutor stated: 
[T]his case is about] civilized society . . . [s]ociety versus the man who 
takes the law into his own hands. It’s society versus the self-appointed 
accuser and self-appointed judge. . . . [O]ur whole system of law is based 
on the concept of justice. Which simply means when you commit a 
crime like this, when you gun down your fellow neighbor in the most 
tragic of ways, stealing from him his ability to run, his ability to bike, his 
ability to walk his daughter down the aisle, when you do something like 
that on the streets of our community then you should be held accounta-
ble. Hold Mr. Campos accountable for his actions and to do that, find 
him guilty on all counts.
51
 
 
 45. 916 N.W.2d 413, 427 (Neb. 2018). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. See also, Mintun v. State, 966 P.2d 954, 960 (Wyo. 1998) (stating that “‘I be-
lieve’ and ‘I think’ are commonly used, colloquial phrases” and “a prosecutor’s inadvertent 
and infrequent use of these phrases is not prejudicial”). 
 48. RONALD WAICUKAUSKI ET AL., THE 12 SECRETS OF PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT 108 
(2009). 
 49. Colonel Louis J. Puelo, Bulletproof Your Trial: How to Avoid Common Mistakes 
that Jeopardize Your Case on Appeal, ARMY LAWYER, Aug. 2008, at 53, 66. 
 50. 309 P.3d 1160, 1167 (Utah Ct. App. 2013). 
 51. Id. at 1173. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals held that this was improper argument that ap-
pealed to passion and prejudice.52 The court stated that it was “most troubled 
by the prosecutor’s reference to Campos’s ‘stealing from [the victim] his 
ability to run, his ability to bike, his ability to walk his daughter down the 
aisle” because the statement “was a direct appeal to the passions of the ju-
ry.”53 The biggest problem with the argument was that the harm to the vic-
tim was combined with a request to hold the defendant accountable, making 
it appear to be a request for the jury to base its conviction on a need to pun-
ish, rather than on the evidence.54 
However, not every reference to the impact of the crime on the victim 
is improper. For example, the defendant in State v. Thompson was charged 
with two counts of forcible sodomy.55 The prosecutor stated in closing ar-
gument that the victim is “going to be dealing with the emotional and psy-
chological scarring[ ] of this for a long time” and “[s]he’s going to have to 
deal with it for the rest of her life.”56 The Utah Court of Appeals held that 
these comments about the long-term effects of the crimes on the victim were 
not improper because they were “a self-evident proposition well within the 
common understanding of lay jurors”57 that were “not likely to inflame the 
passions of the jurors.”58 
E. Send a Message 
During a trial, jurors are reminded multiple times that they have a duty. 
A duty to not contact witnesses or visit the scene of a crime or accident. A 
duty to come on time and not make a decision until they have heard all of 
the evidence. Do they also have a duty to use their vote to send a message to 
deter future crimes? The answer is no, and it is improper for an attorney to 
say that they do. 
The prosecutor in United States v. Sanchez asked the jurors to send 
such a message.
 59 The defendant had testified that although he knowingly 
transported illegal drugs, he did so because drug traffickers had threatened 
his family.60 In his closing argument, the prosecutor stated: 
[W]hy don’t we send a memo to all drug traffickers, to all persons south 
of the border and in Imperial County and in California—why not our na-
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1174. 
 55. 318 P.3d 1221, 1227 (Utah Ct. App. 2014). 
 56. Id. at 1245. 
 57. Id. (quoting State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 854 n.12 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. 659 F.3d 1252, 1254 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 60. Id. at 1255. 
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tion while we’re at it. Send a memo to them and say dear drug traffick-
ers, when you hire someone to drive a load, tell them that they were 
forced to do it. Because even if they don’t say it at primary and second-
ary, they’ll get away with it if they just say their family was threatened. 
Because they don’t trust Mexican police, and they don’t think that the 
U.S. authorities can help them. Why don’t we do that?61 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this argument was improper 
because “prosecutors may not point to a particular crisis in our society and 
ask the jury to make a statement with their verdict.”62 This sort of “send a 
message” argument is improper because it asks the jury to convict “for rea-
sons wholly irrelevant to [the defendant’s] guilt or innocence.”63 
The prosecutor similarly made an improper “send a message” argument 
in State v. Woodard.64 In regard to the charge of theft by deception, the 
prosecutor stated in closing argument: 
This is a theft one nickel and three to 3– ½ cents at a time. We need 
to send a message to those who would fraudulently redeem bottles in 
large quantities from away, we need to send a message that you can’t be 
ripping off Maine beverage distributors who will pass those costs along 
to Maine consumers. We ask you to find Tom Woodard guilty of theft by 
deception in the fraudulent redemption of bottles to Maine distributors.
65
 
The Supreme Court of Maine held that this argument was improper because 
it was an “appeal to public perception or other social issues that go beyond 
the evidence introduced at trial.”66 The court stated that “it is not the role of 
a jury in a criminal case to send messages about matters of public concern, 
even though that may be the effect of a verdict in some instances.”67 Indeed, 
“[j]urors should not be invited to arrive at a verdict for any reason other than 
their evaluation of the evidence of a defendant’s guilt or innocence.”68 
However, not every argument that appears to ask a jury to send a mes-
sage will be deemed improper. For instance, the defendant in the death pen-
alty case of People v. Martinez argued that the prosecutor improperly asked 
the jury to send a message to the community by stating in the closing argu-
ment of the penalty phase: 
 
 61. Id. at 1256. 
 62. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Leon-Reyes, 177 F.3d 
816, 823 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 63. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Nobari, 5741 F.3d 1065, 
1076 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 64. 68 A.3d 1250, 1253 (Me. 2013). 
 65. Id. at 1257 (emphasis in original). 
 66. Id. at 1260. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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[W]hat the death penalty will do in this case is that it certainly will re-
store the confidence and the trust in the system’s ability to deal with 
people that transgress it and that do it in situations that are so aggravated 
and without sufficient justifying or mitigating circumstances that the 
public can see justice is done. They can see and the families can see that 
justice means more than sympathy, and mercy, and warehousing, and re-
habilitation, and that it takes into account the defendant’s conduct and 
the method and manner of his crimes and the impacts that it’s had on the 
ones who suffered.
69
 
The California Supreme Court disagreed, stating that it is not improper for a 
prosecutor to 
”devot[e] some remarks to a reasoned argument that the death penalty, 
where imposed in deserving cases, is a valid form of community retribu-
tion or vengeance—i.e., punishment—exacted by the state, under con-
trolled circumstances, and on behalf of all its members, in lieu of the 
right of personal retaliation” because “[r]etribution on behalf of the 
community is an important purpose of all society’s punishments, includ-
ing the death penalty”70 
There was no impropriety because “the prosecutor did not solicit untethered 
passions nor did he dissuade jurors from making individual decisions;” ra-
ther, “he properly argued that the community, acting on behalf of those in-
jured, has the right to express its values by imposing the severest punish-
ment for the most aggravated crimes.”71 It is important to remember that this 
argument was made in the sentencing phase of a death penalty case where 
punishment was the issue, rather than the guilt phase where a conviction 
must be based on facts. 
F. Fear, Vengeance, or Community Protection 
In 1964, Senator Barry Goldwater charged the Johnson Administration 
with being “soft on Communism.”72 Certainly, no American would want to 
vote for someone that offered support to a sworn, feared enemy. Similarly, 
litigators may be tempted to use such strategies to convince jurors to render 
a verdict out of fear, a desire for vengeance, or the protection of community 
values. This is improper. 
 
 69. 224 P.3d 877, 916 (Cal. 2010). 
 70. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting People v. Zambrano, 163 P.3d 4 (Cal. 2007), 
overruled on other grounds by People v. Doolin, 198 P.3d 11 (Cal. 2009)). 
 71. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Zambrano, 163 P.3d 4). 
 72. Goldwater Asserts Rivals Are ‘Soft on Communism’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 1964), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1964/09/30/archives/goldwater-asserts-rivals-are-soft-on-
communism.html. 
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This sort of fear-based argument was made in the child sexual abuse 
case of State v. Smiley.73 In regard to whether the testimony of a child victim 
should have to be corroborated, the prosecutor stated: 
If the system did work that way, kids would have to be told, we’re sorry, 
we can’t prosecute your case, we can’t hold your abuser responsible be-
cause all we have is your word, and that’s not enough. No one’s going to 
believe a kid or a teen, and we need something else. We don’t do that. 
That’s not how the system works.74 
The Washington Court of Appeals held that this statement amounted to an 
argument that “the State might as well give up prosecuting sex abuse cases 
if the victim’s word was not enough for conviction.”75 This was improper 
because “the implication was clear: if the jury agreed with defense counsel 
and refused to convict without corroborating evidence, other children are in 
danger.”76 
It is likewise improper to induce jurors to render a verdict out of a de-
sire for vengeance. For instance, the prosecutor in State v. Todd “made sev-
eral impassioned references” to what the victim “‘might have told [the jury]’ 
had she been alive to testify.”77 The Utah Court of Appeals held that these 
comments were improper because they could cause the jury to “feel obligat-
ed to seek revenge for the victim.”78 The court emphasized that “[t]he de-
termination of guilt must not be the product of fear or vengeance but rather 
intellectually compelled after a disinterested, impartial and fair assessment 
of the testimony that has been presented.”79 
Similarly, it is improper to urge jurors to render a verdict based on a 
general desire to protect community values or civic order. This type of clos-
ing argument was given in People v. Ortega.80 The prosecutor stated: 
I have to get you to care. Why should you care about this crime? This 
isn’t a robbery. This isn’t a homicide. Why should you care? You should 
care for this city. We do not want an open drug market in Acacia Park 
right in the heart of Colorado Springs. We do not want an open drug 
market directly across the street from Palmer High School. We want 
 
 73. 379 P.3d 149, 152 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016). 
 74. Id. at 154. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 154–55; see also Grant v. State, 194 So. 2d 612, 613 (Fla. 1967) (holding that 
it was reversible error for a prosecutor to argue in a death penalty case, “Do you want to give 
this man less than first degree murder and the electric chair and have him get out and come 
back and kill somebody else, maybe you?”). 
 77. 173 P.3d 170, 175 (Utah Ct. App. 2007). 
 78. Id. at 176 (citing Commonwealth v. Cherry, 378 A.2d 805 (1977)). 
 79. Id. at 176 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Cherry, 378 A.2d at 803). 
 80. 370 P.3d 181, 189 (Colo. App. 2015). 
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people to have jobs and to be productive members of society. We don’t 
want them to be drug dealers.
81
 
The Colorado Court of Appeals agreed that this argument was improper 
because the comments were an attempt to “persuade the jurors to convict 
[the] defendant in order to combat evil for the community.”82 This is im-
proper because a “prosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal de-
fendant in order to protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter 
future lawbreaking.”83 
G. The Golden Rule 
Many prosecutors and defense attorneys were taught at least some ver-
sion of the Golden Rule when they were young. This precept, which states: 
“Do unto others as you would have them do to you,”84 is something that 
attorneys should adhere to as a general practice. However, when it comes to 
asking the jurors to put themselves in the shoes of one of the parties, this 
form of closing argument is impermissible. Golden Rule arguments are im-
proper because they invite the jurors “to cast aside the objective impartiality 
demanded of [them] as [jurors] and judge the issue from personal interest.”85 
An example of this improper argument occurred in the case of State v. 
Lowery, in which the defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree 
murder, attempted first-degree murder, and other related crimes.86 In closing 
argument, the prosecutor invited the jury to imagine what the incident was 
like for the murder victim: “A glorious day . . . and in two minutes, you’re 
going to be, in essence, dead.”87 The prosecutor then referred to the victim 
of the attempted murder: 
[He] tells you, as that’s happening, he doesn’t know what Terrance is do-
ing in the back. He’s not paying attention to him. It’s his wedding night. 
He’s with his bride. They’re going to get something to eat. And then he 
hears a loud noise, glass breaking. Could you imagine being in the state 
of mind where he was and that happening? Think for yourself. What 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (quoting People v. Clemons, 89 P.3d 479, 483 (Colo. App. 2003)). 
 83. Id. (quoting United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 84. Forms of this precept are found in the teachings of Christianity, Confucianism, Bud-
dhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Taoism, and Zoroastrianism. See The Universality of the 
Golden Rule in World Religions, TEACHINGVALUES.COM, http://www.teachingvalues.com/
goldenrule.html (last visited March 29, 2019). 
 85. United States v. Wood, 40 C.M.R. 3, 8 (C.M.A. 1969) (citing United States v. 
Begley, 38 C.M.R. 488 (A.B.R. 1967), overruled on other grounds by United States v. 
Shamberger, 1 M.J. 377, 379 n.2 (C.M.A. 1976)). 
 86. 427 P.3d 865, 873 (Kan. 2018). 
 87. Id. at 886 (ellipsis in original). 
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would be your reaction in that moment as you’re driving, just having 
been married, having a great time, your bride leaning her head on your 
shoulder as you’re going down the street and then you hear this loud 
noise? How long would it take for you to figure out your world is about 
to become unglued?
88
 
The Kansas Supreme Court held that this argument was improper.89 The 
court stated that this argument “fit squarely within the definition of a ‘gold-
en rule’ argument” because “[t]elling the jury to ‘[t]hink for yourself’” and 
“‘what would be your reaction’ had no purpose but to inflame the passions 
and prejudices of the jury and divert its attention from its duty.”90 
Defense attorneys are likewise prohibited from making Golden Rule 
arguments. Indeed, the Maine Supreme Court held in State v. Tarbox that 
defense counsel’s closing argument was improper because “he suggested to 
the jurors that they place themselves in the shoes of a defendant falsely ac-
cused of a crime.”91 The court stated that “[t]he use of such arguments, 
commonly called Golden Rule arguments, is ‘universally condemned’ be-
cause it threatens the essence of a fair trial.”92 
However, not every request of the jury to engage in personalization is 
improper. For instance, the prosecutor in Buszkiewic v. State asked the ju-
rors to place themselves in the victim’s position by stating: 
Where we’ve gotten into and off on a—on a tangent, so to speak, is how 
many times she was slapped. Well, I would submit to you, in your com-
mon affairs, if you were being slapped and you were in that situation, 
would you remember how many times and counting [sic] how many 
times? You think you know. Because it’s important when we come in to 
testify and talk to you, we’ve got to know how many times you got hit. 
You aren’t going to remember in your ordinary affairs the details, espe-
cially if you’ve been up all night and you had been drinking and then 
you come in here and you want me to recount how many times it hap-
pened.
93
 
The Wyoming Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that “an argu-
ment which asks the jurors to draw inferences from the evidence based on 
how a reasonable person would act if placed in the position of the victim is 
not an improper [G]olden [R]ule argument.”94 In addition, the court stated, 
 
 88. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. 158 A.3d 957, 963 n.3 (Me. 2017) (citing Seabury-Peterson v. Jhamb, 15 A.3d 746 
(2011)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. 424 P.3d 1272, 1277 (Wyo. 2018). 
 94. Id. 
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“rhetorical questions which ask the jurors to use their common sense and 
life experiences to weigh the trial evidence do not violate the rule even 
though the prosecutor may ask the jury what they would do in similar cir-
cumstances.”95 The court then held that the argument was proper because it 
was not asking the jury to decide the case based on sympathy or bias, but 
was a request for the jury to “look at the evidence through the lens of their 
ordinary affairs” when determining whether a witness would be able to re-
member the number of slaps during a violent encounter.96 
H.  Outside the Record 
It is improper for an attorney to argue facts that were not introduced in-
to evidence during the trial. It is likewise improper for an attorney to argue 
that the jury should draw an impermissible inference from the evidence. 
In State v. Larrabee, the trial court ruled that the prosecution could not 
introduce any evidence that the victim’s mother had been sexually abused 
by the defendant years ago.97 However, the prosecutor stated in closing ar-
gument: 
When he’s dragging [the victim’s mother] back to the house in Arizona, 
how come she doesn’t scream and say look what he’s doing to me? He’s 
sexually abusing me. He’s doing all these things. Why didn’t she come 
out herself and say [Defendant’s] doing these terrible things to me? Why 
didn’t she have that vengeance then? Why does she wait until she’s not 
in his life at all?
98
 
The Utah Supreme Court held that this statement was “improper and in-
flammatory” because it alluded to evidence that was not introduced at trial.99 
The court stated that by insinuating that other evidence existed, the prosecu-
tor “encourage[d] the jury to determine its verdict based on evidence outside 
the record.”100 
A related form of closing argument that is improper is taking too much 
artistic license with the evidence. For instance, the prosecutor in United 
States v. Moore invited the jury to “imagine” the death of a victim in the last 
minutes of his life: 
Scott Downing is bound with duct tape. It’s pitch black in the back of 
that U-haul. He does not know what’s going to happen to him. He 
 
 95. Id. (citing State v. Williams, 162 A.3d 84, 94–95 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017); State v. 
Bell, 931 A.2d 198, 212–15 (Conn. 2007)). 
 96. Id. at 1277–78. 
 97. 321 P.3d 1136, 1142 (Utah 2013). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1144–45. 
 100. Id. at 1143. 
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must—he must wonder if he’s going to live through this night. . . . He’s 
taken out of that U-haul. He tries to talk but he can’t. All he can do is 
mumble. He feels the grass under his body. He feels the gravel of the 
road. . . . And then a gun is placed to the back of his head and two bul-
lets.
101
 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that this ar-
gument was improper: 
[A] prosecutor may not take artistic license with the trial evidence, con-
struct a more dramatic version of the events, provide conjecture about a 
victim’s state of mind, and then defend against a prosecutorial miscon-
duct claim by maintaining the statements are “fact-based.” Sensationali-
zation, loosely drawn from facts presented during the trial, is still a 
“statement[ ] of fact to the jury not supported by proper evidence intro-
duced during trial.”102 
I. Personal Attacks on the Defendant 
In 2009, President Barack Obama was speaking to a joint session of 
Congress when Representative Joe Wilson yelled out “you lie” during his 
message.103
 
Was Mr. Wilson trying to get attention, be dramatic, or make a 
personal attack? Whatever his purpose, the result was that some of his con-
stituents were so embarrassed and enraged by his actions they yelled the 
same phrase back at him in a subsequent gathering.104 Whatever their place 
may be in a political setting, name-calling and insults are improper in clos-
ing argument. 
A prosecutor who calls the defendant disparaging names during closing 
argument creates a great risk that a court will find that the argument was 
improper. For instance, the prosecutor in State v. Barfield engaged in a re-
markably creative display of name-calling in closing argument by referring 
to the defendant as a “vicious dictator,” a “two-headed hydra,” a “tower of 
terror,” a “monster of mayhem,” and a “king of killers.”105 The Nebraska 
Supreme Court stated that these sorts of comments have “no place in a 
courtroom” because they “create inflammatory prejudice.”106 
 
 101. 651 F.3d 30, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (ellipsis in original) 
 102. Id. (quoting Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). 
 103. Jonah Engel Bromwich, Congressman Who Shouted ‘You Lie’ at Obama Hears the 
Same from Constituents, N.Y. TIMES, (April 11, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/04/11/us/
politics/joe-wilson-you-lie-obama-town-hall.html. 
 104. Id. 
 105. 723 N.W.2d 303, 313 (Neb. 2006), overruled on other grounds by State v. McCul-
loch, 742 N.W.2d 727 (Neb. 2007). 
 106. Barfield, 723 N.W.2d at 313 (quoting Kellogg v. Skon, 176 F.3d 447, 451–52 (8th 
Cir. 1999)); see also Steele v. United States, 222 F.2d 628, 631 (5th Cir. 1955) (stating that 
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Other courts have found similar incidents of name calling to be im-
proper. This includes calling the defendant a “rabid dog,”107 a “bastard,”108 a 
“monster,”109 an “animal,”110 “unadulterated evil,”111 a “terrorist,”112 and 
someone who “can’t keep her knees together or her mouth shut.”113 Courts 
likewise frown on calling witnesses names such as “just a $6,000 excuse 
man” during closing argument.114 
However, not every argument that appears to engage in name-calling 
will be deemed improper. For instance, the prosecutor in Orellana v. State 
called the defendant a “MS-13 thug” during closing argument.115 The Texas 
Court of Appeals held that this characterization was not improper because it 
was a “reasonable deduction” from testimony that the defendant was a gang 
member who had threatened women and children with serious bodily harm 
and death.116 The court held that this evidence met the very definition of the 
term “thug.”117 
A similar result occurred in the first-degree murder case of Common-
wealth v. Clancy.118 In response to the defendant’s claim that he shot the 
victim in the heat of passion, the prosecutor stated in closing argument that 
the defendant was a “cold blooded killer.”119 The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that this argument was permissible because it specifically ad-
dressed an element of the offense that had to be proven—that the defend-
ant’s “actions were willful, deliberate, and premeditated.”120 The court stated 
that while inflammatory name-calling is generally improper, “offense-
centric statements” that “speak to the elements of the particular charges . . . 
and the evidence necessary to prove these elements” are permissible.121 The 
 
the prosecutor calling the defendant “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, a man at home with his family 
suave and, . . . a benign little man, but yet, when he gets down in the dark streets of Houston, 
we find him having his hand in every kind of racket that you can imagine, a man who can do 
that is smart, he is cunning, he is crafty” was so improper that the court should have admon-
ished the prosecutor on its own and directed the jury not to consider the argument). 
 107. Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635, 643 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 108. Gilcrease v. State, 32 S.W.3d 277, 279 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000). 
 109. Ponce v. State, 299 S.W.3d 167, 174–75 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009). 
 110. Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1118 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 111. Id. 
 112. United States v. Moore, 375 F.3d 259, 260 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 113. State v. Madonna, 806 S.E.2d 356, 362 (N.C. 2017). 
 114. State v. Huey, 804 S.E.2d 464, 468–69 (N.C. 2017) (referring to the defendant’s 
expert witness). 
 115. 489 S.W.3d 537, 548 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2386 (1993); NEW 
OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1809 (3d ed. 2010)). 
 118. 192 A.3d 44 (Pa. 2018). 
 119. Id. at 47–48. 
 120. Id. at 65. 
 121. Id. 
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distinction is that characterization based on the evidence and the law is per-
missible, but name calling that is “divorced from the record” or is “irrele-
vant to the elements of the crime at issue” is improper.122 
J. Commenting on the Credibility of Witnesses 
It is improper for an attorney to comment on the credibility of a witness 
during closing argument. Vouching for a witness’s credibility by a prosecu-
tor is especially improper because it induces the jury “to trust the Govern-
ment’s judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.”123 
An example of improper comments on credibility occurred in State v. 
Acuna Valenzuela, when the prosecutor stated in rebuttal, “[T]he defendant 
wants you to stop at the manufactured testimony of [his two witnesses], and 
we ask that you fight a little harder past that. You have been presented with 
the truth.”124 The Arizona Supreme Court held that even though the prosecu-
tor did not expressly “argue that the State had provided the jury with the 
truth, the juxtaposition of ‘manufactured’ defense witness testimony against 
‘the truth’ implied that the prosecution was indeed the party that had provid-
ed the jury ‘with the truth.’”125 Essentially, the court ruled that this was the 
State “impermissibl[y] vouching” for itself.126 
A similarly improper comment on credibility occurred in State v. Hay-
den.127 In closing argument, the prosecutor stated that the social worker and 
detective he called as witnesses were “believable,” that the jury could “rely 
on” the detective’s testimony, and stated that he knew that the search of the 
defendant’s home “had been conducted properly” because the officers in-
volved do “good work.”128 The Montana Supreme Court held that by making 
these comments, the prosecutor had “impinged on the jury’s role by offering 
his own opinion as to witnesses’ testimony.”129 The court held that in stating 
that the social worker and detective were “believable,” the prosecutor made 
“direct statements of [his] opinion that the jury must believe these witness-
es” which constituted reversible error.130 
 
 122. Id.; see also Browning v. State, 188 P.3d 60, 72 (Nev. 2008) (holding that it was not 
improper for the prosecutor to refer to the defendant and his actions as evil in closing argu-
ment because the comment “merely expressed the gravity of the” charged crime of first-
degree murder). 
 123. United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 133 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. 
Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
 124. 426 P.3d 1176, 1197 (Ariz. 2018). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. (citing State v. Vincent, 768 P.2d 150, 155 (Ariz. 1989)). 
 127. 190 P.3d 1091 (Mont. 2008). 
 128. Id. at 1095. 
 129. Id. at 1097. 
 130. Id. 
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However, not every comment about witness credibility is improper. For 
instance, the prosecutor in State v. Williams stated in closing argument, “I’m 
going to suggest to you that the defendant made a lot of his story up as he 
testified on the stand” and “his version is false, his version is fabricated . . . 
you should . . . disregard his testimony.”131 The Kansas Supreme Court stat-
ed that although “it is improper for a prosecutor to offer his or her personal 
opinion on a defendant’s credibility,”132 a prosecutor is allowed to “make 
statements about a defendant’s trustworthiness ‘to point out inconsistencies 
in a defendant’s statements and to argue evidence that reflects poorly on a 
defendant’s credibility.’”133 The court held that the prosecutor’s statements 
were proper when considered in context, because he started by emphasizing 
that it was the jury’s job to determine weight and credibility of testimony 
and he also gave “specific reasons why the trial evidence established the 
defense theory was infeasible.”134 In short, “the prosecutor was advancing 
reasonable inferences based on the physical evidence, which supported his 
suggestion that [the defendant’s] testimony was unbelievable.”135 
III. INVITED RESPONSE 
Prosecutors and defense attorneys should always keep in mind that 
their actions may open the door to argument from opposing counsel that 
would otherwise be deemed improper. This is known as the “invited re-
sponse” doctrine that had its beginnings in the tax evasion case of Lawn v. 
United States.136 
In Lawn, the defense attorney argued that the case was a persecution of 
the defendants that had been instituted in bad faith and also claimed that the 
prosecution’s two main witnesses were perjurers.137 In rebuttal, the prosecu-
tor stated, “We vouch for [the two witnesses] because we think they are tell-
ing the truth.”138 The United States Supreme Court held that the prosecutor’s 
 
 131. 429 P.3d 201, 205–06 (Kan. 2018). 
 132. Id. at 207 (citing State v. Pribble, 375 P.3d 966 (Kan. 2016)). 
 133. Id. (quoting State v. Brown, 331 P.3d 781 (Kan. 2014)). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.; see also Bland v. Sirmons, 459 F.3d 999, 1025 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that it is 
not improper for a prosecutor to refer to a defendant as a liar based on “irreconcilable dis-
crepancies between the defendant’s testimony and other evidence in the case”); Common-
wealth v. Coren, 774 N.E.2d 623, 631 n.9 (Mass. 2002) (stating that “where the evidence 
clearly supports the inference that the defendant lied, the prosecutor may fairly comment on 
it”); People v. Howard, 575 N.W.2d 16, 28 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a prosecutor 
may characterize the defendant as a liar if the comment is based on the evidence produced at 
trial). 
 136. 355 U.S. 339, 359 n.15 (1958). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
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statement did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial because the comments 
of the defense “clearly invited the reply” by the prosecution.139 
In United States v. Young, the Supreme Court clarified that the “invited 
response” doctrine “should not be read as suggesting judicial approval or 
encouragement of response-in-kind that inevitably exacerbates the tensions 
inherent in the adversary process.”140 Indeed, the doctrine does not mean that 
otherwise improper comments from a prosecutor are proper if given in reply 
to the comments of a defense attorney, but it means that the “invited re-
sponse” may not be prejudicial.141 Thus, “if the prosecutor’s remarks were 
‘invited,’ and did no more than respond substantially in order to ‘right the 
scale,’ such comments would not warrant reversing a conviction.”142 
Courts have invoked the invited response doctrine to find that other-
wise improper arguments are not reversible error. For example, the defend-
ant in Powell v. State argued that the prosecutor engaged in improper argu-
ment when she stated, “If we think it’s a bad arrest, if we think there’s not 
enough evidence, what happens to that case? It goes. We don’t bring it to 
indictment if we think the person is innocent, if there is not enough evi-
dence.”143 The Georgia Supreme Court agreed that these comments were 
highly improper, but held that they did not amount to reversible error be-
cause they were an invited reply to the defense attorney’s speculative re-
marks in closing about the motives of the prosecutor for bringing charges.144 
Similarly, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld a death sentence under 
the invited response doctrine in State v. Thomas.145 In that case, the defend-
ant was convicted of murder, and the jury sentenced him to death after find-
ing that the aggravating circumstance of his prior convictions for violent 
felonies outweighed any mitigating circumstances.146 During closing argu-
ment of the penalty phase of trial, the prosecutor stated: 
I’m going to start off this morning by apologizing . . . for wasting your 
time this week because you heard it, they’re both doing a lot of time al-
ready. Why in the world are we down here? Let’s just forget this murder. 
I’m sorry, Ms. Day, James Day’s death should be a freebie. I mean, 
they’re already doing a lot of time.147 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). 
 141. See id. 
 142. Id. at 12–13. 
 143. 733 S.E.2d 294, 297 (Ga. 2014). 
 144. Id. at 299–300. 
 145. 158 S.W.3d 361 (Tenn. 2005). 
 146. See id. at 375–76. 
 147. Id. at 414. 
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The defendant claimed that this was improper argument.148 The court agreed 
that “community conscience arguments are generally improper,” but stated 
that “a prosecutor’s closing argument must be evaluated in light of the de-
fense argument that proceeded it.”149 The court noted that the prosecutor’s 
statement was an obvious response to the defense’s attempt to invoke com-
munity conscience by arguing that there was no need for the death penalty 
because the defendant had already received long sentences for his prior con-
victions.150 Thus, the court concluded that there was no reversible error.151 
Prosecutors and defense attorneys must always be cognizant of the in-
vited response doctrine when they prepare for and give closing arguments. 
They should keep in mind that if they are not careful in their own closing 
arguments, they may open the door to improper arguments from opposing 
counsel that are not deemed to be reversible error. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
No article could list every possible form of improper closing argument. 
However, this Article has identified the most common forms of improper 
argument that occur in every jurisdiction in the country. It is incumbent up-
on every prosecutor and defense attorney to learn the rules of closing argu-
ment and abide by them. 
Not only are these forms of improper argument identifiable with proper 
study and training, they are also unnecessary and foolish. Because “studies 
demonstrate that most jurors have made up their minds before hearing clos-
ing argument,” it would seem that attorneys would understand that risks of 
crossing the line far outweigh any potential benefit.152 “[W]hy would an 
attorney run the risk of reversal during closing argument, with improper 
comment, when the demonstrable consensus is that the efficacy of summa-
tion” is lower than the other parts of the trial?153 A closing argument given 
in a new trial years later after reversal on appeal is likely to be even less 
effective. 
In addition, an attorney who makes improper arguments always runs 
the risk that the jury may recognize that the arguments are improper and 
conclude that the attorney is engaging in unfair conduct. Research has 
shown that even strangers who observe one party acting unfairly towards 
 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179 (1986)). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d at 415. 
 152. Craig Lee Montz, Why Lawyers Continue to Cross the Line in Closing Argument: An 
Examination of Federal and State Cases, 28 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 67, 68 (2001). 
 153. Id. at 69. 
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another will attempt to punish the person who is acting unfairly.154 No attor-
ney wants to be punished by a jury for an improper comment made during 
closing argument. 
Of course, the most important reason for attorneys to avoid closing ar-
gument that are out of bounds is because they have an ethical duty to do 
so.155 “Given the seriousness of these trials and the ramifications of appellate 
court reversals, the public, the victims of crime, and the defendants deserve 
no less.”156 
 
 154. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 308 (2011). In fact, studies have 
shown that this sort of altruistic punishment of unfair behavior increases activity in the pleas-
ure centers of the brain. Id. 
 155. See UTAH RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(e); see also supra text accompanying 
note 3. 
 156. Bell v. State, 723 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Altembernd, C.J., 
specially concurring). 
